This paper studies discretionary non-cooperative monetary and …scal policy stabilization in a New Keynesian model, where the …scal policymaker uses a distortionary tax as the policy instrument and operates with long periods between optimal time-consistent adjustments of the instrument. We demonstrate that longer …scal cycles result in stronger complementarities between the optimal actions of the monetary and …scal policymakers. When the …scal cycle is not very long, the complementarities lead to expectation traps. However, with a su¢ ciently long …scal cycle -one year in our model -no learnable time-consistent equilibrium exists. Constraining the …scal policymaker in its actions may help to avoide these adverse e¤ects.
Introduction
Fiscal and monetary policies face di¤erent institutional restrictions and operate at di¤erent frequencies. Monetary policy maker sets interest rate every month, and the decision process can arguably be described as (constrained) optimization with the clear aim to stabilize the short run ‡uctuations. 1 In contrast, …scal decisions are often taken annually, and the policy of contemporary …scal authorities can rarely be described as aiming to stabilize the economy in the short run. This situation is likely to change, however, if …scal policy is given a more active short run stabilization role: not only the …scal policy becomes more focussed on stabilization, but also the decision process becomes more regular. This paper contributes to the discussion on the institutional design of stabilizing …scal policy, which operates at lower frequency than monetary policy does, uses distortionary taxes as a policy instrument, and acts without implementation lags. This institutional design has important implications for the dynamics of the economy. With longer …scal cycle the optimal …scal adjustments are bigger; they impact more on monetary policy maker and escalate the con ‡ict between the two authorities in case the …scal policymaker uses distortionary taxes. Indeed, optimal actions of the monetary and the …scal policy makers are dynamic complements in the sense of Cooper and John (1988) : higher tax rate, set by the …scal policy maker in response to a higher debt level, generates the cost-push in ‡ation, which increases the marginal return to a monetary policy decision to raise the interest rate and contribute to the debt accumulation. In standard quarterly models this reinforcement mechanism is weak; we demonstrate that it is greatly ampli…ed if discretionary …scal policy operates only infrequently.
We show that the gain from monetary and …scal policy stabilization of macroeconomic ‡uc-tuations can be greatly overestimated, if it is evaluated using models with frequent …scal policy stabilization. We can fail to account for arising expectations traps (King and Wolman, 2004) with implications of excessive volatility of welfare-relevant economic variables; we can also fail to realize the necessity to constrain the …scal policymaker, as time-consistent policy may not exist.
We study interactions of monetary and …scal policies in the Blanchard and Kahn (1980) class of in…nite horizon non-singular discrete-time linear dynamic models that is typically used to study aggregate ‡uctuations in macroeconomics. We use the standard New Keynesian model with monopolistic competition and sticky prices to demonstrate the results. The economy is controlled by monetary and …scal policy makers which act non-cooperatively at di¤erent frequencies. The monetary policy maker optimizes every period while the …scal policy maker optimizes less frequently, choosing the distortionary tax rate once every several periods. After the tax rate is chosen, it stays at this level until the next …scal optimization. The …scal policy maker has an intra-period leadership: the monetary policy maker observes …scal policy at every period, and the …scal policy maker knows that the monetary policy maker optimizes every period and takes into account his reaction function when formulating policy.
More speci…cally, we demonstrate the existence of expectations traps in the case of longer …scal cycles; although we also …nd that these traps are unlikely to present a problem for a policymaking. Following Dennis and Kirsanova (2012) we investigate stability properties of these equilibria and …nd that the Pareto-preferred equilibrium is selected in all cases we study. More importantly, we demonstrate that welfare-preferred discretionary equilibria may not exist, once the …scal cycle is su¢ ciently long -one year in our model -and the reinforcement mechanism between the optimal actions of the two policymakers is particularly strong. We argue that …scal policymaker, who optimizes only infrequently and optimally chooses to make large corrections, needs to be made constrained in its actions. We uses a number of policy scenarios to illustrate our …ndings, they include stabilizing debt faster than socially optimal, and infrequent …scal optimization of a constrained …scal policymaker.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next Section we present a model of monetary and …scal policy interactions. Section 3 presents the general framework with infrequent stabilization. Section 5 discusses policy implications in three special cases: quarterly, biannual and annual …scal stabilization. Section 6 concludes.
The Model
We consider the now-mainstream macro policy model, discussed in Woodford (2003) , modi…ed to take account of the e¤ects of …scal policy. 2 It is a closed economy model with two policymakers, the …scal and monetary authorities. Fiscal policy is assumed to support monetary policy in stabilization of the economy around the non-stochastic steady state.
The economy consists of a representative in…nitely-lived household, a representative …rm that produces the …nal good, a continuum of intermediate goods-producing …rms and a monetary and …scal authority. The intermediate goods-producing …rms act under monopolistic competition and produce according to a production function that depends only on labor. Goods are combined via a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) technology to produce aggregate output. Firms set their prices subject to a Calvo (1983) price rigidity. Households choose their consumption and leisure and can transfer income through time through their holdings of government bonds. We assume that the …scal authority faces a stream of exogenous public consumption. These expenditures are …nanced by levying income taxes 3 and by issuing one-period risk-free nominal bonds.
We assume that all public debt consists of riskless one-period bonds. The nominal value B t of end-of-period public debt then evolves according to the following law of motion:
where t is the share of national product Y t that is collected by the government in period t, and government purchases G t are treated as exogenously given and time-invariant. P t is aggregate price level and i t is interest rate on bonds. The national income identity yields
where C t is private consumption. For analytical convenience we introduce B t = (1+i t 1 )B t 1 =P t 1 which is a measure of the real value of debt observed at the beginning of period t, so that (1) becomes
The …rst-order approximation of (3) about the non-stochastic zero-in ‡ation and zero-debt steady state yields
where
and letters without time subscript denote steady state values of corresponding variables in zero in ‡ation steady state. The private sector's discount factor = 1=(1 + i). We have assumed B = 0 in order to make the presentation of the model particularly simple. This assumption results in no …rst-order e¤ects of the interest rate and in ‡ation on debt, so that the …nal version of the linearized debt accumulation equation can be written as
where we used the linearized (2) to substitute out output and denoted = C=Y . 4 The derivation of the appropriate Phillips curve that describes Calvo-type price-setting decisions of monopolistically competitive …rms is standard (Benigno and Woodford, 2003, Sec. A.5) and marginal cost is a function of output and taxes. A log-linearization of the aggregate supply relationship around the zero-in ‡ation steady state yields the following New Keynesian Phillips curve
where =
(1 )(1 ) ( + ) is the slope of Phillips curve. Parameter is Calvo parameter, parameter is Frisch elasticity of labour supply, is elasticity of intertemporal substitution and parameter is the elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated goods: Cost push shock t follows an autoregressive process.
The social loss is de…ned by the quadratic loss function 5
while the monetary and the …scal policy makers can have di¤erent policy objectives,
Each policy maker knows the laws of motion (4)-(5) of the aggregate economy and takes them into account when formulating policy. The following assumption follows Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) and substantially simpli…es the exposition of the model.
Assumption 1 (policy instruments)
The monetary policymaker chooses consumption c t and then, conditional on subsequent optimal evolution of c t and t ; decides on the value of interest rate that achieves the desired c t and t . The …scal policy maker uses the tax rate t as policy instrument and keeps government spending constant g t = 0.
Apart from making the exposition clear, keeping …scal spending constant allows us to focus on the particular transmission mechanism of monetary and …scal policy.
Despite the simplicity of the model, …nding time-consistent optimal policy is not trivial. Of course, the economy can be completely insulated against shocks if the two policy instruments are adjusted to o¤set the e¤ect of shocks on in ‡ation and debt. However, such policy would be time-inconsistent as it would need to o¤set the e¤ect of expectations E t t+1 on current in ‡ation. In what follows we assume that both policy makers and the private sector know that the decision making is sequential and a di¤erent policymaker may be in the o¢ ce in future periods. We refer to this policy as policy under discretion. Formally, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 2 (policy) Monetary and …scal policy mix satis…es the following assumptions.
(i) Monetary and …scal authorities act non-cooperatively.
(ii) Both authorities are assumed to optimize sequentially under time-consistency constraint.
(iii) The monetary policy maker optimizes every period, but the …scal policy maker optimizes once every N periods, N 1.
(iv) The …scal authority has intra-period leadership.
The assumption of …scal intra-period leadership is motivated by the observation that the monetary policy reaction function is much more transparent and predictable, so the …scal policy maker is able to take it into account when formulating policy. 6 Using the interest rate as an instrument implies that consumption and price-setting decisions are made simultaneously, while in this model they are consecutive decisions taken by relevant agents. This makes no di¤erence for our results.
The assumption of time-consistency prevents the complete and instantaneous stabilization of the economy. Moreover, the relatively large adjustments of infrequent …scal policy may create more di¢ culties for monetary policy to o¤set the e¤ect of disturbances on the economy. Smooth stabilization may not be possible any more.
The infrequency of …scal decisions can be interpreted as …scal commitment to the policy of …xed tax rates in all periods between the optimization. Such policymaking, however, remains sequential, without the ability to manipulate the expectations of the private sector beyond the periods between …scal reoptimizations.
Assumption 3 (policy objectives) Both policy makers are benevolent.
Di¤erent objectives of the two policy makers are likely to result in a con ‡ict between the policy makers as one policy maker tries to 'undo' the perceived harm done by the other. 7 We 6 Simultaneous moves of the two policy makers could be another possibility. Empirical evidence (Fragetta and Kirsanova, 2010) suggests that in countries without …scal decentralization, like the UK, the regime of …scal leadership is the most relevant.
7 See e. g. Dixit and Lambertini (2003) , Lambertini (2006) .
shall demonstrate that a similar con ‡ict exists even if both policy makers are benevolent but operate at di¤erent frequencies. The assumption of di¤erent frequencies also makes the leadership structure important. If both policy makers are benevolent and face identical constraints, then the intra-period leadership does not play any role. In our case the policymakers face di¤erent constraints, so the leadership does matter. In this paper we have chosen to study …scal leadership as arguably most empirically relevant. Finally, we make the assumption which is crucial for clear exposition without the loss of generality.
Assumption 4
The model is perfect-foresight deterministic.
If the stochastic model is linear-quadratic (LQ) then the stochastic component of the solution can be obtained in the unique way once the deterministic component is known. 8 We are interested in issues of existence and uniqueness of the time-consistent policy and these properties are una¤ected by the introduction of stochastic components in the LQ framework.
To summarize, the law of motion of the deterministic economy can be written as:
and the initial state b is known to all agents, and coe¢ cients { = 1 + ; = (1 ) : Debt b t is the only endogenous predetermined state variable. The objectives of each policy maker coincide and are given by formula (6).
Discretionary Equilibrium
In this Section we de…ne discretionary equilibrium in which the monetary policy maker reoptimizes every period while the …scal policy maker decides once every N periods, N 1: We refer to the period between …scal reoptimizations as the …scal cycle. We denote the set of numbers p congruent to a modulo N as Suppose the monetary and …scal policy maker both optimize at period t. Because of the LQ nature of the problem we guess and verify later that the private sector's reaction function is a linear function of the state:
Use (9) for p + 1 and substitute (7) for the appropriate period to obtain:
8 See Anderson, Hansen, McGrattan, and Sargent (1996) . 
and p = 1; ::; N 1: The monetary policy maker observes …scal policy, and takes into account its 'instantaneous'in ‡uence, measured by c p .
The …scal policy maker only optimizes in periods [0] N . Suppose the optimization happens at time t. The Bellman equation which describes the …scal policy decision can be written as:
where constraints (8), (10), and (12) We assume that the …scal policy maker, when chooses t also sets t+p p = 1; ::; N 1 such that
This policy has the following representation
Indeed, take (17) one period forward and use (16) to obtain
The complete set of constraints can be written as
where the coe¢ cients with superscript 0 are obtained by the recursive substitution t+k ; k = 1::p; and p = 0; ::; N 1: Substitute these constraints into the Bellman equation (15) and di¤erentiate with respect to t to yield:
From (10), (12) and (17) it follows
which determines the time-consistent reaction of the private sector in (10). The resulting transition of the economy for p = 0; ::; N 1 can be written as:
Substitute them into (11) and (15) to yield
and
It follows that V = S 0 = S N : in periods when both benevolent policy makers reoptimize their value functions are the same.
Proposition 1 Given Assumptions 2-4 the stationary discretionary equilibrium with intra-period …scal leadership can be described by the set of coe¢ cients
Proof. For a given b 0 = b; each trajectory fb t ; t ; c t ; t g 1 t=0 which solves the system of …rst order conditions (8), (10), (12), and (17) we can uniquely map into the set of coe¢ cients V [ f
, satisfying (13), (14), (22), (23), (25) and (26). Conversely, if the set of
solves (13), (14), (22), (23), (25) and (26) we can uniquely map it into the trajectory fb t ; t ; c t ; t g 1 t=0 ; solving system (8), (10), (12) 
Calibration
The model is highly stylized and involves relatively few parameters. Table 1 reports the baseline calibration of parameters. Calibration of ; and is relatively straightforward, they correspond to the most frequently estimated values of the steady state annual interest rate of 4%, the average frequency of price changes of one year, and consumption to output share of 75%. Estimation and the consequent calibration of the remaining three parameters varies across studies. Estimates of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply vary widely, depending on whether macroor micro-evidence is used. Peterman (2012) reports values of 2 [2:9; 3:1] from the empirical work which matches volatilities of aggregate worked hours and of wages. This range is consistent with values used by macroeconomists to calibrate general equilibrium models but greater than the estimates of 2 [0:3; 0:8] which are obtained in microeconomic studies even if decisions on labour participation are taken into account, see Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber (2011) . The main source of this di¤erence lies in the heterogeneity of the workforce's reservation wages. When a larger proportion of the workforce's reservation wage is about the market wage, a small change in the market wage leads to a large change in the labour force participation, see Chang and Kim (2005) and Gourio and Noual (2009) . However the density of marginal workers can only be observed at the macro-level; the e¤ect is larger in countries with higher involuntary unemployment which leads to higher aggregate elasticity of labour supply. This e¤ect is not identi…ed at the micro-level where a small change in the market rate often does not lead to a noticeable change in the participation status of an individual. So we consider values between 0.3 and 4 plausible for . Similarly, estimates of the intertemporal elasticity vary depending on the wealth of the representative households and the proportion of nondurable goods in their consumption bundle, see Atkeson and Ogaki (1996) , Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) . The empirical evidence for is quite far-ranging from near 0.1 reported in e.g. Hall (1988) and Campbell and Mankiw (1989) , to above 1 reported in e.g. Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) . Weber (1993, 1995) …nd that the estimate of increases from 0.3 for the aggregate data to 0.8 for cohort data, suggesting that the aggregation, which is implicit in the macro data, may cause a signi…cant downward shift in the estimate of .
The elasticity of substitution between goods, ; determines the monopolistic mark up. Chari et al. (2000) argue for a markup of 11% for the macroeconomy as a whole. Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) obtain elasticity of substitution 7.88, corresponding to a markup of 14.5%. Di¤erent industries have di¤erent markups, Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) and Nevo (2001) report mark ups of 27-45% for automobiles and branded cereals industries.
We use base line values of parameters as reported in the …rst column in Table 1 , but we also investigate the robustness of our results to the range of alternative calibrations given in the second column in Table 1 .
Policy Interactions
In this section we study how an increase in the length of the …scal cycle a¤ects the economy under discretionary policy. Dynamic complementarities play a crucial role in shaping the dynamics of the economy once the …scal cycle becomes longer.
We start with the known case of frequent monetary and …scal policy stabilization. 9 We use this example to discuss the transmission mechanisms of monetary and …scal policy interactions.
We continue with the case of biannual …scal optimization, which enables us to demonstrate how the dynamic complementarity between the optimal actions of consequent monetary policy makers within the …scal cycle results in multiple discretionary equilibria and potential expectation traps. We also demonstrate that the agents are likely to coordinate on the best equilibrium.
These two cases help us to investigate the more complex case of annual …scal optimization, which is arguably the most empirically relevant case. We demonstrate how the dynamic complementarity between the optimal actions of monetary and …scal policymakers leads to expectation traps. Although we demonstrate that in this case the coordination problem is likely to be resolved as well, as all agents are more likely to coordinate on the best equilibrium, we also show that the existence of these equilibria is very sensitive to the parameterization of the model and to the length of …scal cycle. We argue that actions of the …scal policymaker should be restricted to some extent, as this ensures the existence of good equilibrium outcome for a wide range of parameterization of the model and policy scenarios, as well as for longer …scal cycle.
Quarterly Fiscal Stabilization
In the standard case of frequent stabilization both policy makers operate at the same quarterly frequency. The model is simple enough to prove the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If 0 < < 1; > 0; > 0 then a stationary discretionary equilibrium exists and unique.
Proof. The system of …rst order conditions (13), (14), (22), (23), (25) and (26) can be written as follows (where we omit the index p):
9 See Blake and Kirsanova (2011) for a general form solution to this class of problems.
Using several substitutions we transform the system of …rst order conditions (27)-(31) into the system of two equations in fC b ; b + C b g:
Equation (33) only depends on z = b + C b and always has exactly one positive solution as the free term is negative. The unique positive root satis…es
so that the equilibrium is stationary. To see this, note that if z + is the positive root, then
Indeed, supposez + = (1 ) = :z + is not the positive root to (33); if it was the positive root then the negative root would bez = ({ ) 2 = ( ) and their sum should have been equal to the negative linear coe¢ cient; butz
Moreover, anyz + < (1 ) = is not a root of (33), because Figure 2 and its characteristics are given in Table  2 .
Equilibrium A is IE-stable under all types of learning discussed in Section ??, and we report this in Table 2 .
It is easy to see that because equilibrium A is stationary, i.e. 1 j1 ( b + C b )j < 1; then equation (??) implies that the …x-point of T P S is locally stable under the PS-learning.
IE-stability under the JF-learning plays an important role in the analysis of cases with longer …scal cycle. Using the fact that all equilibria are IE-stable under the L-learning, and replicating the steps of the revision process of all agents who are learning, helps us to discover RE equilibria in this and more complex cases with longer …scal cycle. We illustrate this process in Panel II of Figure  2 . Suppose the …scal policy maker considers implementing policy b ; which is not necessarily optimal. In response to this policy the followers learn their optimal response fC b ; S; b g. Their learning problem is equivalent to the joint learning in the single-policymaker setting, which is discussed in details in Blake and Kirsanova (2012) and Dennis and Kirsanova (2012) . If b = 0 then the …scal policymaker does not respond to debt and there is unique set fC b ; S; b g P which describes the case in which the monetary policymaker and the private sector coordinate on the reaction so that in response to higher debt the monetary policymaker generates high demand and The result of Proposition 2 on the uniqueness of the equilibrium is not obvious if the model has dynamic complementarities between action of the economic agents (Cooper and John, 1988) . Optimal actions of the monetary authority and of the aggregated private sector can be dynamic complements. Suppose the reaction of …scal policy is given and …xed at b : For a given reaction of the private sector b in t = b b t the monetary policy …nds the optimal response by solving the corresponding Bellman equation, taking into account its intra-period leadership. If b is su¢ ciently high (low) then in response to higher-than-steady-state debt the monetary policymaker optimally raises demand. Greater tax base leads to higher tax collection and reduces the level of debt towards the steady state. In ‡ation starts moving back to the steady state. We plot this U-shaped optimal recation function C b = C b ( b ) in the left hand side chart of Panel I in Figure 3 with the solid line. In its turn, the optimal reaction of the private sector b = b (C b ) is increasing in C b : If the debt is higher than its steady state level and the monetary policymaker generates higher demand, the total e¤ect of the higher demand on marginal costs is always positive, as the tax rate is …xed to b : We plot the positively sloped reaction function b = b (C b ) in the left hand side chart of Panel I in Figure 3 with the dashed line. Both lines are positively sloped in the area with relatively large b , and this can result in multiplicity of partial equilibria, i.e. in multiplicity of optimal responses of the monetary authorities and the private sector. Indeed, if we reduce (e.g. halve) the …scal feedback b then there are three points of intersection of optimal reactions of monetary authorities and the private sector, see the right hand side chart. The case in the left hand side chart in Panel I corresponds to multiple discretionary equilibria discussed in Blake and Kirsanova (2012) where the …scal feedback on debt of non-strategic …scal policy was relatively small to guarantee multiplicity of equilibria.
Optimal actions of …scal policy and the private sector can be dynamic complements too. To understand this suppose the debt is higher than its steady state level. Because C b < 0 the demand is automatically reduced and so are marginal costs. Lower demand also contributes to faster debt accumulation. If the response of in ‡ation to debt is only moderately positive, then the optimal response of taxes to debt rises with stronger response of in ‡ation. This will keep debt under control, and will not compromise in ‡ation stabilization. As a result, the reaction curves of the private sector and the …scal policymaker are both positively sloped, but only in a relatively narrow area of responses of the private sector. For our baseline calibration, and given C b ; there are three jointly optimal discretionary responses of …scal policymaker and the private sector. However, only one of them results in discretionary equilibrium in the model, as the other two partial equilibria require di¤erent optimal policy response once the monetary policy becomes strategic.
Finally, and most importantly for our study, optimal actions of the monetary and the …scal policymakers can also be dynamic complements. Higher tax rate, set by the …scal policy maker in response to a high debt level, b , generates greater cost-push in ‡ation, which increases the marginal return to a monetary policy decision to reduce demand and contribute to the debt accumulation. The monetary policy reaction function C b = C b ( b ) is negatively sloped, see Panel III in Figure 3 . Conversely, a reduction in response of demand to debt, C b ; makes it optimal to raise taxes in order to prevent too fast accumulation of debt. As a result, the …scal policy reaction function b = b (C b ) is also negatively sloped in wide area, see Panel III in Figure 3 .
The presence of dynamic complementarities is a necessary condition for the multiplicity of discretionary equilibria, see King and Wolman (2004) and Blake and Kirsanova (2012) . However this condition is not su¢ cient and, as we argue next, the interaction of the two mechanisms in the model with frequent …scal optimization results in the uniqueness of the equilibrium.
First, the complementarity between optimal decisions of the private sector and of the monetary policy maker may result in multiplicity only if …scal policy optimally responds to debt only weakly, see Panel I, the right hand chart. The optimal …scal response b even to the weak initial guess b is strong enough to rule out the equilibrium with passive monetary policy.
Second, although the optimal decision of the …scal policy maker is increasing in the optimal decision of the monetary policy maker, this dynamic complementarity between optimal decisions of the two policy makers in case of frequent …scal optimization is not strong enough to create the multiplicity.
The following two cases demonstrate how the longer …scal cycle increases the strength of dynamic complementarities in the model and how this shapes the optimal outcome of monetary and …scal policy interactions.
Biannual Fiscal Stabilization
Suppose that both policy makers optimize in even periods, and we index all such periods with index 0. Only the monetary policy maker optimizes in odd periods, we index such periods with index 1. To save on notation we use the period index p 2 f0; 1g and use p to indicate odd periods if p = 0; and even periods if p = 1.
Despite we cannot prove analytically the existence and multiplicity of equilibria, we can …nd all discretionary equilibria numerically.
Proposition 3 For the base line calibration of the model two discretionary equilibria exist.
Proof. The …rst order conditions derived in Section 3 can be written as
After multiple substitutions the system of …rst order conditions (34)- (40) can be reduced to the polynomial system of two equations C 0
although at the expense of much complexity. We plot solutions to these equations in Panel I in Figure 4 . The curves intersect in two points with V = S 0 > 0; S 1 > 0; and B 0 b B 1 b < 1:We label these points of intersection as equilibria A and B.
Multiplicity of discretionary equilibria implies that following a disturbance, for example a higher initial debt level, the economy can follow one of multiple paths, each of which satis…es conditions of optimality and time-consistency. Each of these paths is associated with di¤erent monetary and …scal policies; see Figure 5 which plots two di¤erent adjustment paths following the same initial increase in the debt level. For comparison, the Figure also includes responses in case of frequent …scal stabilization.
Suppose the level of debt is above the steady state and …scal policy raises the tax rate for two periods. Following the high marginal cost in ‡ation will rise and stay above the steady state for these two periods. The monetary policy maker will …nd it optimal to intervene. The monetary policy maker at time 0 takes into account monetary policy in period 1. There is a dynamic complementarity between the actions of the two consequent monetary policy makers within the …scal cycle: the deeper is the future cut in demand, the bigger payo¤ the current monetary policy maker gets from engineering high demand today. A high demand today results in optimal reduction of demand in the future, within the same …scal cycle. Two point-in-time equilibria arise. In the …rst such equilibrium, the period-0 monetary policy maker will keep the current demand low and the period-1 monetary policy maker does not generate a big cut in demand. In the second equilibrium, the period-0 monetary policy maker stimulates high demand in anticipation that the period-1 monetary policy maker will implement a cut in demand. The …scal policy maker when choosing policy in period 0, perceives the both possibilities. The optimal …scal response in the …rst point-in-time equilibrium response is to raise the tax rate less than in the second equilibrium. The strong response of the tax rate in the second equilibrium generates a 'zig-zag'pattern of adjustment: with low two-period-average demand, the increase in the tax rate generates substantial fall in the stock of debt so that the second half year cycle 'mirrors'the …rst half year one, but with the opposite sign. Figure 5 also demonstrates that in equilibrium A the paths of all variables 'approximate' the optimal paths of the corresponding variables under frequent optimization, and we shall call equilibrium A 'approximating'. We call equilibrium B 'zig-zag'.
Despite the clearly increased in ‡ation volatility, the loss in the approximating equilibrium is slightly lower than it is in the unique equilibrium under frequent optimization, see Appendix ??. This is mainly due to faster stabilization of the economy in this equilibrium. The two-period tax rate increase predominantly determines the two-period speed of debt adjustment ; but it also induces very high volatility of economic valuables. Finally, equilibrium A is IE-stable under all types of learning we consider in this paper. Equilibrium B is not IE-stable under both JF-and J-learning. Panel II in Figure 4 illustrates this.
To summarize, the main conclusion from the example of biannual …scal stabilization is the demonstration of the existence of the approximating equilibrium. Although the other equilibrium exists, the approximating equilibrium delivers the best possible outcome under the infrequent discretionary …scal stabilization, and is also the only equilibrium which is IE-stable under all types of learning we study in this paper. In this equilibrium the monetary policy maker can o¤set most adverse e¤ects of …scal infrequency on welfare-related macroeconomic variables. In the next example we argue that we should not take this result for granted once the …scal cycle becomes longer.
Annual Fiscal Stabilization

Multiplicity of Discretionary Policy Equilibria
Building on results in the previous section we present the third example of infrequent …scal stabilization. Arguably, this is the most empirically relevant setup in which the monetary policy maker reoptimizes every quarter, but the …scal policy maker reoptimizes only at the beginning of every four quarters. In this model we are unable to present the system of …rst order conditions as a system of two polynomial equations and use the graphical method of …nding solutions. We have to resort to numerical methods and the stability properties to …nd discretionary equilibria of interest.
Proposition 4 If the monetary policymaker takes decisions quarterly and the …scal policymaker optimizes annually then for the base line calibration of the model there are two discretionary equilibria which are IE-stable under the JF-learning.
Proof. The proof relies on the use of numerical methods. As discussed in Section 5.1 we search for equilibria which are IE-stable under the JF-learning by replicating the steps of the revision process of all agents who are learning. For every, not necessarily optimal 0 b we …nd all lim no further equilibria were discovered. 12 The dynamic complementarity between the optimal actions of the two policy makers is responsible for the multiplicity of equilibria. An optimal response of monetary policy reinforces the action of …scal policy: higher levels of taxation have a cost-push e¤ect and so the optimal monetary response is to reduce demand and the tax base. Smaller tax base requires a higher tax rate to ensure the desired speed of debt stabilization. Both policy makers can coordinate on either slow or fast correction of the level of debt towards the target. Figure 7 illustrates these interactions. Consider equilibrium A. Suppose the initial debt is higher than in the steady state and the tax rate is kept high for four periods. This implies a steep reduction in debt. The e¤ect of future high tax rates and high marginal cost creates expectations of high future in ‡ation. If monetary policy does not o¤set the e¤ect of …scal 'infrequency'then debt and consumption adjust in a linear way 1 1 The limit is computed numerically with tolerance jx k+1 x k j < 10 13 . 1 2 In the area of discontinuity in Panel I the time-consistent representation of the …xed tax rate policy requires in…nitely large feedback on debt in the last quarter The tax rate remains high for the four periods and, by the end of the fourth period, it is much higher than it would be if optimization happened every period. The tax correction in the …fth period brings in ‡ation down. Figure 7 demonstrates that the ability of the optimal monetary policy to reduce in ‡ation volatility is limited. Indeed, it is clear from the picture that consumption should go down …rst and then up in the …rst four periods if the in ‡ation humps in …rst two periods to be eliminated. Such stabilization results in sub-optimally high volatility of consumption. In what follows we call equilibrium A 'slow approximating'. This equilibrium is IE-stable under all types of learning we consider in this paper, lim n!1 T n j 0 b = 0A b ; j 2 fP S; JF; Jg Under discretionary equilibrium B the tax rate is initially kept above the frequent-optimization benchmark. This generates a much steeper reduction of the level of debt than is observed in the slow approximating equilibrium A. The higher tax rate results in a higher level of in ‡ation and lower consumption. We call equilibrium B 'fast approximating'. This equilibrium is not IEstable under the J-learning but is stable under the private sector learning and the JF-learning. The IE-stability under the JF-learning allowed us to locate it, see Figure 6 .
To summarize, in case of the annual …scal cycle there are at least two discretionary policy equilibria. Only two equilibria are IE-stable under the JF-learning. Their existence is a result of the strong dynamic complementarity between optimal actions under the two policies, monetary and …scal, given that …scal policy uses distortionary taxes as the policy instrument. However, their existence is likely to be non-robust to the model speci…cation; this is suggested by Panel I in Figure 6 . Indeed, equilibria A and B are located on the same curve 0 b 0 b ; which may not intersect the 45 o line at all. In the next section we discuss why this may occur.
Existence of Approximating Policy Equilibrium
We argue that the existence of the approximating equilibrium is not robust to changes in model calibration and to policy scenarios. To communicate the argument we present several examples. Fast Stabilization of Debt Consider a policy scenario in which the …scal policy maker is assigned an additional target to stabilize debt faster than socially optimal, such as the new European Fiscal Treaty. Suppose the monetary policy maker is benevolent, but the …scal authority's objective function is modi…ed to include a debt target
If the …scal policy maker is benevolent, as studied above, then b = 0.
The strength of the dynamic complementarity depends on the calibration of . Both approximating equilibria do not exist if b > 0 and is su¢ ciently high. 13 In order to understand this result, consider the familiar scenario of high initial debt. Suppose that both policy makers are benevolent and we are in the slow approximating equilibrium A; see the left panel in Figure 7 . If we impose a debt target for …scal policy, i.e. start increasing b 0, the …scal policy maker will try to speed up the debt stabilization with an increase in the tax rate relative to the benchmark case of b = 0. The cost-push e¤ect will increase in ‡ation more and so the monetary policy maker will choose to engineer a bigger fall in consumption. This, of course, will slow down the speed of debt stabilization and require an even higher tax rate. The process converges: each additional reduction in demand requires a smaller increase in the tax rate. Equilibrium exists, and in this equilibrium the debt is reduced faster than is plotted in the left panel in Figure 7 .
This contrasts with the e¤ect of introducing the debt target in equilibrium B. Suppose debt is higher than in the steady state by one unit, policy makers are benevolent and we are in the fast approximating equilibrium B; see the right panel in Figure 7 . Note that in this equilibrium debt is stabilized with an observed overshooting after the …rst year. If we impose a debt target, i.e. start increasing b 0, then raising the tax rate in the …rst several periods becomes counterproductive. If the tax rate is raised higher than in the b = 0 case, this results in even bigger overshooting of debt, which works towards destabilizing the debt. In order to ensure faster debt convergence the tax rate has to rise less and monetary policy has to engineer a smaller fall in consumption. The …scal policy maker anticipates that demand will not respond much and will lower the tax rate. This process converges: each additional reduction in the size of demand cut requires a smaller reduction in the size of the tax rate increase.
To summarize, with the increasing weight on the debt target equilibria A and B move towards each other so that the dynamics of the economy in equilibria A and B become similar. The dynamic of the economy in response to the higher debt level in the limiting case A = B is plotted in Figure 8 . For comparison we also plot the result of frequent stabilization without the debt target.
If the debt target becomes even stronger, then no approximating equilibrium exists. Any proposed increase of the tax rate 0 b results in a strong optimal IE-stable under the JF-learning response of the other agents within the …scal cycle. To counteract the perceived response requires the bigger initial rise 0
We can summarize this outcome in the form of the following proposition.
Proposition 5 For the base line calibration of the model and with su¢ ciently high weight on the debt target of …scal authorities the approximating discretionary equilibrium does not exist. Figure 4 suggests that 'zig-zag' equilibrium might exist. 14 Strategic complementarity between the actions of subsequent monetary policy makers may lead to a zig-zag adjustment of demand within the …scal cycle. These adjustments might be '…ne tuned'such that the annual average magnitude of them is not large enough to provoke the destabilizing increase in the tax rate. However, such equilibrium is not IE-stable under the JF-and J-learning. Moreover, it is di¢ cult to call such equilibrium 'approximating'.
The existing algorithms for …nding solutions are not suited to obtaining all possible equilibria in a complex case with many states. We could only do this for the quarterly and the biannual models. However, Figure 6 makes it clear that the approximating equilibrium will disappear if the debt target is su¢ ciently strong, rather than we suddenly became unable to locate it numerically. We can be reasonably sure that if an additional equilibrium exists in the annual optimization model, this equilibrium will not be IE-stable under the JF-and J-learning, it will also generate a very low level of social welfare because of the high volatility in macroeconomic variables.
Calibration of the Model The existence of the approximating equilibrium is also sensitive to the calibration of the model. Calibrations of the model which result in stronger reactions of monetary and …scal policies are likely to lead to non-existence of the approximating equilibrium.
Both approximating equilibria do not exist if the Frisch elasticity labour supply is reduced to 2.3, or if the baseline value for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is only slightly increased to 0:35; or if the elasticity of substitution between goods is reduced to 5.7 which corresponds to an increase of the mark up to 21%.
All these threshold values of parameters are completely plausible and are within the range of estimates which are often obtained in empirical studies of aggregated data, as we argue in Section 4.
High Level of Debt
The main case discussed in Section 2 assumes zero level of the steady state debt. This assumption re ‡ects the relatively small proportion of the short-term debt in a typical developed economy, and allows us to present many results in an analytical way. However, high and persistent level of debt is not uncommon.
We can rewrite our model in the more general form, using interest rate as the monetary policy instrument, and retaining the possibility to study implications of higher level of steady state debt. We can demonstrate that the size of the steady state level of debt a¤ects the strength of the dynamic complementarity. The e¤ect of the nominal interest rate and in ‡ation on the process of debt accumulation rises linearly with the steady state level of debt. In response to high in ‡ation the optimal monetary policy will raise interest rate; both the high (real) interest rate and the consequently low tax base increase the rate of debt accumulation, and this e¤ect is stronger with higher steady state level of debt.
The numerical analysis of this scenario produces diagrams that are remarkably similar to the case of the debt target. If the steady state debt to output ratio reaches approximately 0.25 -which corresponds to short-term debt to annual output ratio of 0.07 -then discretionary equilibria A and B coincide. With higher debt to output ratio the approximating equilibrium does not exist.
Frequency of Fiscal Optimization
The strength of the dynamic complementarity depends on the frequency of …scal optimization. The longer the period between the reoptimizations the longer the tax rate remains …xed, and the stronger action of monetary policy is required in order to o¤set the adverse e¤ect on in ‡ation when the tax is adjusted. The approximating discretionary equilibrium may not exist.
Constraining the Fiscal Policymaker In order to preserve the approximating equilibrium the strength of the complementarity should be reduced. One way to achieve this is to constrain the …scal policymaker by imposing penalty on the excessive movement of …scal instrument is su¢ ciently large then the complementarity between the monetary policymaker and the private sector's actions leads to multiplicity, very similar to the result in Dennis and Kirsanova (2012) . Panel III in Figure 6 demonstrates the outcome when = 0:1: There are two stationary equilibria, both of which are IE-stable under all types of learning which we consider. If …scal policy does not react to debt su¢ ciently strongly -in this case because it is constrained -then the agents can either coordinate on equilibrium A in which the private sector does not expect the monetary policymaker reacts to debt but stabilized in ‡ation and the monetary policymaker validates these expectations, or they can coordinate on equilibrium B in which the private sector expects the monetary policymaker accommodates in ‡ationary shocks but ensures fast stabilization of domestic debt and the monetary policymaker validates these expectations.
Conclusion
In this paper we study the implications of infrequent discretionary …scal optimization for the stabilization of the economy, assuming dynamic interactions of monetary and …scal policymakers where both policymakers are benevolent and the …scal policymaker uses distortionary taxes to stabilize the economy. We demonstrate the presence of dynamic complementarity between the optimal monetary and …scal policies. A higher tax rate, which is required to stabilize higher debt, will have a cost-push e¤ect. The optimal monetary policy response to this will generate a reduction in demand and in the tax base, and faster debt accumulation. Anticipating this, the …scal authorities will wish to raise tax rates further.
If both policies operate with the same frequency, this reinforcement mechanism is weak and does not lead to signi…cant adverse e¤ects. However, with longer …scal cycle, the e¤ect of this mechanism is greatly ampli…ed. If the length of …scal cycle is not too long then expectation traps arise. With more periods between …scal reoptimizations and with stronger reinforcement mechanism an (IE-stable) discretionary equilibrium may not exist.
We demonstrate the latter outcome for many practical scenarios. We argue, therefore, that the …scal policymaker who reoptimizes only infrequently should be constrained. As one of possible ways to constrain the policymaker we demonstrate that a moderate penalty on variability of the …scal instrument can be useful in reducing the degree of dynamic complementarity between the actions of the two policymakers.
